Collective action of small farmers: A case study of Ruoheng farmer watermelon cooperative in China by Huang, Zuhui et al.
  1
111 EAAE-IAAE Seminar ‘Small Farms: decline or persistence’ 
 




th June 2009 
 
 
Collective action of small farmers: 
A case study of Ruoheng farmer watermelon cooperative in China 
 
Zuhui  Huang  (China Academy for Rural Development, Zhejiang University, 
268  Kai-Xuan  Road, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China. Email Address: 
zhhuang@zju.edu.cn.) 
Qiao Liang (China Academy for Rural Development, Zhejiang University, 
268  Kai-Xuan  Road, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China. Email Address: 
liangqiao2323@126.com) 
G.W.J. Hendrikse (Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, PO Box 
1738 Office T8-56, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands, ghendrikse@rsm.nl.) 
Copyright 2009 by Zuhui Huang, Qiao Liang, and George W.J. Hendrikse. All 
rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for 
non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears 
on all such copies.   
 
Abstract:  Watermelon production investments, incomes and the access to 
markets between members of a cooperative and individual small farmers are 
compared. The results of the case study regarding members of a watermelon 
cooperative and five individual small farmers in Zhejiang province in China indicate 
that members of the cooperative are prone to produce food of higher quality, have 
obvious advantage in accessing modern food supply chains over individual small 
farmers, and subsequently gain a significantly higher return or income than individual 
small farmers. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The product supply chain in China is undergoing transformation in both structure and 
management (Hu and Reardon, 2004). At present, the product circulation system in 
China is diversified. It includes not only the traditional production-supply-marketing 
system constituting of small farm households, peddlers, processing enterprises, 
wholesalers and retailers, but also new retailers such as synthesized supermarkets and 
specialized fruit supermarkets. Small-scale farmers are hardly capable of dealing with 
these dynamic markets. There are imbalances between sellers and buyers regarding 
the distribution of benefits and risk sharing in the product value chain in China. 
Farmers receive hardly a reasonable share compared to the risk they shoulder, due to 
their weak bargaining power. 
Not only in China, but also in most of the countries, especially developing countries, 
the prospects for smallholders are being challenged. The changing production 
methods, increased concentration in the supply chain, low world prices and more open 
markets to international competition are threatening to small farmers (Hazell and 
Poulton et al. 2006).   
Responding to the perceived challenges, farmer cooperatives were established to help 
small farmers. There is a substantial literature about the benefits and necessities of the 
development of organizations that help farmers to face large markets (Staatz, 1987; 
Zusman and Rausser, 1994; Valentinov, 2007). As an organization of small farmers, 
farmer cooperatives can be regarded as an extension of individual family farms, 
which makes it possible to combine the advantages of family based farms with the 
external economies of scale in purchasing, marketing, and bargaining (Valentinov, 
2007). Following the World Development Report (2002), “producers’ organizations 
amplify the political voice of smallholder producers, reduce the costs of marketing of 
input and outputs, and create opportunities for producers to get more involved in 
value-adding activities”. Zusman and Rausser (1994) point out that under market 
failure, collective action yields efficiency improvements over uncoordinated private 
action. However, Stockbridge (2003) concludes that the transaction costs of doing 
business with third parties are replaced in part by the transaction costs of organizing 
themselves together.   
Based on these theoretical arguments, we investigate the claim that small farmers who 
market through a cooperative or who are members of a cooperative gain relatively 
higher returns than individual farmers from empirical evidence. The main objectives 
of the study are to: 
1) determine differences in the investment and returns between farmers joining a 
cooperative and individual small farmers. 
2) identify the key factors contributing to advantages of a cooperative over individual   3
farmers. 
3) address what can be done to make improvement in cooperatives to gain more value 
added for farmers. 
The article is organized as follow. Section 2 reviews the literature about small farmers 
and farmer cooperatives and concludes proposition. Section 3 is dedicated to 
methodology. Results of the data analysis are presented in section 4. Finally, 
conclusions and some further research tips are formulated in section 5. 
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Advantages and disadvantages of small farmers are discussed (2.1). Then the role of 
farmer cooperatives as a response to the dilemma and challenge that small farmers are 
facing is reviewed and a proposition is formulated (2.2). 
2.1 Advantages and dilemmas of small farmers 
A number of definitions have been proposed to describe both small farmers and small 
farms. Farms of less than 2 hectares are deemed as small farms (Hazell, 2006). Small 
farms also have been defined as household units that make most management 
decisions, control most of the farm labors supply, and normally much of the capital as 
well (Devendra, 1993). Correspondingly, the World Bank (2003) refers to 
smallholders as those with a low asset base, operating less than 2 hectares of cropland. 
Narayanan and Gulati (2002) characterize a smallholder as a farmer practicing a mix 
of commercial and subsistence production or whose family provides the majority of 
labor and the farm provides the principal source of income. Wapenham (1979) regards 
a small farmer as an agricultural producer controlling no more land than he can farm 
without the permanent employment of non-family labor. Adams and Coward (1972) 
defines a small farmer as one who had very little access to political power, productive 
assets, and/or income streams within society. Heidhues and Bruntrup (2003) point out 
small-scale farmers often correlate with poor-resource, low-income or low technology 
farming.  
Valentinov (2007) point out that small scale family farming is still dominating in 
agriculture production. One of the advantages supporting small farms is family 
management and family operation, which is derived from the specific characteristics 
of agricultural production. These characteristics include the significant dependence of 
production on nature, high asset specificity, inelastic demand for agricultural products 
and inputs, and the special role of land as a production factor (Valentinov, 2007). A 
high dependence on nature makes the supervision cost of hired labors especially high 
(Pollak, 1985), which favors the family-based mode in agricultural production, as well 
as small farms.   4
Another point regarding the advantage and disadvantage of small farmers lies in the 
economies of scale. Economies of scale are defined by a production function which 
exhibits a more than proportional increase in output for a given increase in magnitude 
of all input (Johnson and Ruttan, 1994). Two types of economies of scale are 
identified, i.e. internal economies of scale and external economies of scale (Johnson 
and Ruttan, 1994). Internal economies of scale are related to the agricultural 
production process, while external economies of scale are observed in terms of access 
to inputs, credits, services, storage facilities, marketing, and distribution opportunities. 
The consensus of researchers on the question of whether internal economies of scale 
exist in agriculture is that, except under very specific circumstances, they do not. On 
the one hand, empirical studies (Garcia, Sonka, and Yoo, 1982; Peterson and Kislev, 
1991; Jaforullah and Devlin, 1996) typically find the nonexistence of production scale 
economies in agriculture. On the other hand, Valentinov (2007) regards the first 
disadvantage of small size farms lies in the inability to realize the external economies 
of scale. Small scale producers generally lack the power and negotiation capacity in 
their relationship with either upstream or downstream agents (Bienabe, 2004). Since 
upstream input suppliers and downstream processing or marketing firms have 
significantly larger sizes than individual small farmers, small farmers lack 
‘countervailing power’ (Bonus, 1986; Staatz, 1987) to realize bargaining power 
balance or external economies of scale. Staatz (1987) argues that farmers face 
significant risks of their trading partners exercising opportunistic expropriation of 
quasi-rents on their specific assets.   
2.2 Cooperatives as response to small farmers’ dilemma 
Due to the dilemma between the efficiency of family-base agricultural production and 
the limitation in external economies of scale, a new institutional arrangement or 
government structure is pursued. Staatz (1987) argues that cooperatives allow their 
members to capture many of the advantages of large-scale marketing, input 
production, and strategic planning while still permitting farmers to make most of their 
farm-level decisions themselves. He regards a commonly cited advantage of farmer 
cooperatives as their ability to reduce the variability of farmers’ incomes through the 
pooling of grower returns and expenses across products, time, and space, i.e. pooling 
leads to some reduction in risk.   
Valentinov (2007) proposes that cooperatives overcome the disadvantages of small 
farmers’ low market power and less market access by marketing, purchasing, and 
bargaining. Successful market access development can be reached through collective 
actions by organized small farmers together. A cooperative can increase returns to 
members in two ways: through improving the efficiency of distribution system and 
through political action (Staatz, 1987). The political way is especially important in 
areas of agricultural production where public involvement is large. The advantage in 
distribution efficiency is usually referred to the reduction of transaction costs in 
decision, negotiation and contracting, etc, as well as the reduction of transportation   5
costs. Some more persuasive evidence is derived. Sexton (1990) analyses the effect of 
farmer cooperatives in an oligopsonistic and spatial market model and finds that the 
presence of a cooperative makes farmers better off compared to a market of only 
individual farmers. He put emphasis on the yardstick effect of farmer cooperatives 
and argues that cooperatives likely cause farmers to perform better than they 
otherwise would. Following the point of Sexton (1990), Tennbakk (1992) establishes 
a duopoly market model not only including the farmers’ surplus but also taking into 
consideration the consumers’ surplus. He argues that the total production, consumers’ 
surplus, as well as total market welfare are all greater in the cooperative duopoly 
market than in the private duopoly market. And the presence of cooperative does 
make members better off, but at the expense of non-member farmers’ being worse off. 
Regardless of farmers’ being better off or worse off compared with the situation 
without presence of cooperatives, we definitely see a favored benefits of members 
over non-members from the above review. This is summarized in our proposition.   
Proposition: cooperatives can help Members achieve higher profits than individual 
farmers. 
3 METHODS 
Firstly measurements of factors related to proposition are chosen (3.1). Then 
watermelon production in the Zhejiang province in China, and especially the selected 
case cooperative, as well as data information, are introduced and specified (3.1). 
Finally hypotheses are formulated based on the proposition and cases selected (3.3).   
3.1 Measurements 
According to the proposition mentioned above, what we try to measure are benefits or 
advantages of cooperatives over individual farmers. On the one hand, sale channels 
will be looked into to find out if there are substantial differences between the 
cooperative and individual farmers. The market access advantage is emphasized by 
many researchers (Staatz, 1987; Bienabe, 2004; Valentinov, 2007). On the other hand, 
net economical profits of the two groups will be compared. As cooperatives are jointly 
owned by members and members hold the residual claim rights, profit of the 
cooperative is taken as the joint profits of all the members and is compared with that 
of farmers.   
Let  c Π  and  f Π   be the net profits per mu (1mu = 667m2 or 0.0667ha, or 1 hectare 
= 15mu) of the cooperative and individual farmers respectively. And ii i i p ac Π= − , 
where  i p  is the price per kg,  i a  is the average production area of each farmer, and 
i c   is the average production and packing costs of each farmer. ‘i’ is denoted to either   6
cooperative or individual farmer.   
3.2 Case selection and introduction 
Watermelon is a cosmopolitan fruit and it ranks five in the top ten of world biggest 
fruits. China has the largest growing area and gross output of watermelon in the world. 
Zhejiang is one of the biggest provinces in the production of watermelon in China. 
According to the statistical data, the total area of watermelon in Zhejiang was 95,280 
hectare in 2006, compared with 84,410 hectare in 2005. And the gross output was 
2.90 million tons, compared with 2.56 million tons in 2005 (Data source: Zhejiang 
Statistical Yearbook 2007). 
Wenling is a city famous for watermelon production. It is called ‘hometown of 
greenhouse watermelon in China’, due to its nice climate and soil condition of 
southeast littoral, as well as advanced greenhouse techniques. Ruoheng watermelon 
cooperative was selected as case cooperative as it covers a biggest melon growing 
areas and has a largest membership among all the watermelon cooperatives in 
Zhejiang province.   
Ruoheng farmer watermelon cooperative was established in July 2001, and was 
registered with a capital of Y522,000. The farming area and share of each member is 
decided on the basis of the member’s technical level of production and management. 
A member has to pay Y1,000 for each share, with a maximum share of 10%. The 
registered brand “Yulin” is maintained by strict standards in production, quality 
inspection, packaging, marketing, delivery and traceability.   
The production bases of the cooperative are not limited in local provinces, but 
extended to other provinces of different climates to grow watermelons in different 
seasons. Up to the end of 2008, the cooperative has had 19 production bases, with a 
total area of 20,070 mu (1 mu = 667m
2 or 0.0667ha, or 1 hectare = 15 mu), and 352 
members. The locations of the production bases vary from west to east and from north 
to very south. Watermelons of different bases are picked and delivered to markets at 
different times of the year because of the different climates and other natural 
conditions, which ensures year round supply of watermelon.   
The decision-making mechanism of the cooperative is based on “one member, one 
vote”. The cooperative offers fixed wages and bonus to the members and temporary 
labor forces every month. Each of the cooperative members gets Y1000 per month as 
a fixed wage which can also be viewed as the labour cost of the cooperative, 
compared to a common firm. Besides, they take the financial system of twice 
returning according to the transaction volumes and the shares as well. At the end of 
the year, expanding fund and risk fund are firstly deducted from the net profit. The 
profit remained will be distributed to members according to their contributions and 
shares. The “contribution” refers to the watermelon output of each member or the   7
volume of internal transaction between the cooperative and members. The expanding 
fund is used to invest in new production bases, while the risk fund is to be reserved 
for natural disaster and accidental costs, such as typhoon, which happens quite often 
in summer season in the southeast of China.   
3.3 Hypotheses 
Two hypotheses are formulated based on the proposition and measurements. 
Hypothesis 1: The watermelon cooperative has access to more diversified marketing 
channels than individual farmers. 
Hypothesis 2: Members of the cooperative gain higher profits than individual farmers. 
3.4 Data collection and description 
Semi-structure interviews were conducted with the cooperative manager, as well as 
individual melon farmers, using a questionnaire that covered all the basic information, 
including data regarding personal information, production areas, costs, prices and sale 
channels, etc. Semi-structure interview is chosen out of structured, semi-structured 
and unstructured interview because of its advantages in enabling interviewees to 
probe deeply, to solicit expansive responses, and thereby uncover previously hidden 
detail (Burgess, 1982). Five individual melon farmers who didn’t join the cooperative 
were selected randomly in Wenling city to be interviewed as a comparison group to 
the cooperative. 
According to the interviews, both cooperative members and individual farmers are 
full-time growers of watermelon. The costs and benefits of the cooperative and 
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Table 1, Data regarding watermelon production and sale of the cooperative and 
individual farmers (Y/mu) 
Items  The cooperative  Individual farmers
1 
Seeds/seedlings 45  270 
Fertilizer and pesticide  1,100  1,470 
Machine costs  250  100 
Packing costs  1,500  0 
Cost of labor    350 
Cost of land rent  900  900 
Output  (kilogram)  4,000  5,000 
Sale price    (Y/kg)  3.0  1.2 
Average production area 
per farmer (mu) 
5   10  
Sale channels  Synthesized supermarkets: 50%; 
Specialized fruit supermarkets: 
30%;  
Franchised stores: 10%;   
Restaurants: 10%. 
Wholesalers: 95%;   
Others (retail): 5%. 
Data source: field investigation updated in 2008. 
The cooperative purchases all the seeds and let members grow saplings themselves, 
while individual farmers buy tree seedlings directly. It on the one hand saves seeds 
expense for members and on the other hand contributes to uniform production 
standardization.  
Packing costs only occur to the cooperative because watermelons of the cooperative 
are sorted firstly and then packed with mesh bags and paper bags, while watermelons 
of individual farmers are sold without any package. 
Both members of the cooperative and individual farmers rent lands to grow 
watermelon, rather than use their own lands. That’s because watermelon can not be 
grown in the same farmland in a continuous year. Farmland that has been used to 
grow watermelon has to be sown with other crops for more than three years to recover 
the soil fertility before it can be used again to grow watermelon. Farmers keep 
looking for new land for the melon production every year around.   
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Results regarding the hypotheses are presented (4.1). And some key factors 
contributing to the results are discussed (4.2). 
                                                        
1  Data of individual farmers are averaged data of the five interviewed individual farmers.   9
4.1 Results 
Data in Table 1 is simplified and coded in Table 2. 
Table 2, Costs and profits of the two groups 
Items Members  Individual  farmers 
Production and packing 
Costs (Y) 
3,795 3,090 
Sale price    (Y/kg)  3.0  1.2 
Output  (kg/mu)  4,000  5,000 
Profits (Y/mu)  12,000  6,000 
Net profits (Y/mu)  8,205  2,910 
Sale channels/Customers  Supermarkets: 80%;   
Franchised stores: 10%;   
Restaurants: 10%. 
Wholesalers: 95%;   
Others (retail): 5%. 
Data source: field investigation updated in 2008. 
According to Table 2, we see a significant difference in general production and 
packing costs between the cooperative members and individual farmers. Members of 
the cooperative have a 22.8% higher investment in production and packing than 
individual farmers. The main disparity in costs comes from packing and machinery. 
Packing costs of members include package material such as labels, net bags and paper 
boxes. But hardly any packing costs occur to individual farmer, i.e. farmers’ 
watermelons are sold without package. Besides, farmer cooperatives are more likely 
to utilize machinery technology than individual farmers, due to the collection action 
effect both in finance and utilization. An obvious result is drawn that members of the 
cooperative have a higher investment level than individual farmers. 
Substantially different sale channels of watermelons are observed between the 
cooperative and individual farmers, which is a good reflection of the co-existence of 
supply chains, i.e. the modern supply chain characterized by supermarkets and the 
traditional supply chain based on the wholesale markets. The supermarkets that the 
cooperatives transact with include synthesized supermarkets and specialized fruit 
supermarkets. Individual farmers neither have the countervailing power to negotiate 
with supermarkets, nor can they meet the private standards of supermarkets, like 
continuous and stable supply of products. The marketing channels described confirm 
our hypothesis that the cooperative has more access to diversified markets.   
Both the general profits and the net profits imply an obvious difference between 
members and individual farmers. More striking difference is observed in sale prices, 
which are Y3.0 per kg and Y1.2 per kg respectively. The sale price difference can be 
explained by several reasons. High quality is one of the key factors contributing to 
high price. Higher quality of the cooperative’s watermelon is derived from the   10
uniform production standard and high investment in packing. Secondly, brand effect 
and reputation account for another important reason. “Yulin” is now a well-known 
brand for its favorable taste, as well as nice appearance. Thirdly, the direct delivery 
from the cooperative to supermarkets and franchising retail stores tends to gain a 
higher price than that through wholesalers. In other words, the cooperative helps to 
internalize some profits from other stages of supply chains. We conclude the 
confirmation of the hypothesis that members of the cooperative do gain significantly 
higher profits than individual farmers. 
4.2 Discussion 
The above stated results on the one hand have confirmed the benefits of the 
cooperative over small scale farmers in big markets; on the other hand induce the 
interests in pursuing the reasons that contribute to the farmer cooperative’s advantage. 
We try to find out reasons through looking at some attributes of the cooperative. 
Firstly, a quasi-membership or restricted membership system is applied in the 
Ruoheng cooperative while most cooperatives in China are still applying the open 
membership policy. Farmer cooperatives can be distinguished into two main types: 
traditional cooperatives and new generation cooperatives (Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000). 
New generation cooperatives contain a series of improvements compared to 
traditional ones (Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000; Chaddad and Cook, 2002), such as 
closed membership, more clearly defined property rights, and more defensive purpose, 
etc., which help them to be more propitious to the modern markets and to the object of 
income increment. Valentinov (2007) thinks that open membership leads to the 
free-rider problem and the horizon problem, i.e. members can capture benefits from 
their investment only over the horizons of their expected membership, which causes 
short-term investment and/or underinvestment. Besides, with the system of 
quasi-members or close membership, the Ruoheng cooperative tends to ensure 
relatively homogenous membership, which is especially important in reducing the 
decision costs of a cooperative (Bienabe and Coronel, et al., 2004).   
Secondly, the Ruoheng watermelon cooperative has realized large volume supplies 
and year-round stable delivery of fresh watermelon by growing in different climate 
areas around China, which is never possible for small individual farmers. The rising 
of supermarkets and the consequent procurement and distribution centers in the 
supply chain brings big effects on wholesale markets and retail markets, as well as on 
producers (Hu and Reardon, et al., 2004). They also find that the supermarket 
revolution is spreading faster in China than anywhere else in the world. Supermarket 
chains impose private standards of quality and safety on producers. One of the 
requirements formulated by supermarkets is that farmers have to be able to produce 
on a regular basis and to deliver a large quantity of goods at a consistent rate (Hu and 
Reardon, et al., 2004). Farmers can hardly ensure a volume and consistent deliver of 
fresh products individually. Ruoheng watermelon cooperative leads the way in   11
realizing consistent deliver by growing in different season areas. 
Thirdly, support and guidance from governments externalizes a quantity of costs for 
Ruoheng cooperative. Zhejiang is the most developed province in the development of 
farmer cooperatives and legislations.    “Rules of Farmer Professional Cooperatives of 
Zhejiang Province” was implemented on Jan. 1st, 2005, which was the first formal 
law of farmer cooperatives in China. The national “law of farmer cooperatives of 
China” was put into practice on Jan. 1st, 2007. There are a series of measures 
provided by governments of city levels and provincial level in Zhejiang province to 
help farmer cooperatives in foundation, production techniques, marketing and 
subsidies as well. The support from governments, to a great extent, impels 
cooperatives to keep going and improving.   
5 CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCHES 
The case study tests the proposition that farmers who join together in a cooperative to 
take collective actions are prone to have more opportunities and possibilities to gain 
access to modern supply chains and acquire higher income returns than individual 
small farmers. Farmers acting collectively are no longer a mere price recipient. They 
establish countervailing power to negotiate with other parties in markets. Farmer 
cooperatives can not only reduce transaction costs and gain larger value added 
through their collective action, but also keep the economy residuals within the 
agriculture, consequently to form a self-accumulating and developing ability for the 
agricultural sector. 
Looking at the robustness of the testing result, there is not only an increasing body of 
theoretical supports which are reviewed in the theory part (Bonus, 1986; Staatz, 1987; 
Sexton, 1990; Valentinov, 2007), but also a quantity of empirical evidence (D’Haese, 
et al, 2005; Huang et al, 2008). D’Haese, et al (2005) use data of a sample of 70 dairy 
farms and find that cooperative membership contributes to increased input, increased 
yield, better market access, and increase in income. Huang et al (2008) also prove the 
role of farmer cooperatives in helping farmers in transaction cost reduction, and value 
added gaining, based on a sample of 60 pear farmers. 
There are several directions for future research. First, this case study is limited by the 
size of the sample, which consists of one case cooperative and five individual farmers. 
More cases of farmer cooperatives and individual farmers have to be included for 
further testing and analysis. Then regression analysis can be adopted if the size of the 
sample is big enough. Second, the study is focused on a specific product. Testing can 
be extended to contain different products, like cereals, vegetables, fruits and livestock. 
Third, in spite of the benefits in joining in a cooperative, why there are still large 
quantities of small farmers sticking to individual production and marketing? Are there 
any other specific reasons for the co-existence of cooperatives and individual 
farmers?    12
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